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Socialization in the Academic and Professional Field: 
Revealing the Homo Oeconomicus Academicus 
Alexander Lenger ∗ 
Abstract: »Habitusformation und Feldsozialisation im wirtschaftlichen und 
wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Feld: Die Entschlüsselung des Homo Oeconomicus 
Academicus«. The paper analyses the formation of the habitus of economists in 
Germany. To reconstruct the economic habitus, a qualitative agency analysis will 
be conducted, i.e., the agency of professors and the process of professional so-
cialization will be revealed. The project follows up on the substantial literature on 
the indoctrination vs. self-selection debate in economics. In short, this debate 
asks why economists are more self-oriented than other groups. While some au-
thors find strong evidence for a learning effect in economic studies, other au-
thors provide evidence that a process of self-selection takes place before entry 
to the economic profession. Overall, the paper aims at answering how stable a 
habitus can be, and what forms of habitus modification professionals face when 
entering new fields. The results show that the widely used distinction between 
indoctrination and selection is not suitable. Rather, I will demonstrate that a 
field theory perspective considering the process of professional field socialization 
as a form of field-specific accumulation of capital is needed to explain the am-
biguous results. 
Keywords: Sociology of economics, economists, academic socialization, profes-
sional socialization, professional habitus, economic habitus, habitus-field-
theory, Pierre Bourdieu. 
 
I don’t know that economists necessarily know, in terms of raw knowledge, any-
thing that noneconomists don’t. I think what economists do have is a certain way 
of solving problems, a certain way of looking at the world, that noneconomists often 
do not. So it’s a different way of approaching a problem, and certainly a different set 
of criteria for making decisions… And many times that’s lost on noneconomists. 
(Interview with an economist, Reay 2012, 59) 
1.   Introduction 
To date, the sociology of economics (Fourcade 2005) has produced a great 
number of relevant insights regarding the nature and character of economists. 
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In recent years, the strong performative influence of economic scientists and 
experts on the structure of societal and especially economic processes has been 
substantiated (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu 
2007; Reay 2012; Hirschman and Berman 2014), the ‘superiority’ of econo-
mists within the social sciences has been identified (Lazear 2000; Colander 
2007; Lebaron 2006; Fourcade, Ollion and Algan 2015), and the formation of a 
global profession of economic scientists has been researched (Fourcade 2006). 
Of course, even if specific national differences persist within this global profes-
sion (Lebaron 2001; Fourcade 2009; Hesse 2010; Hirte 2013; Franklin 2016), 
scholars agree in one regard: Economics constitute an extraordinary, excep-
tional profession. 
Beyond this, a great number of empirical and experimental studies evince a 
pattern of behaviour specific to the field of economics. Economists do not 
merely have their own specific rhetoric (McCloskey 1990; Klamer 2007); their 
attitudes differ significantly from those of the general population with regard to 
economic matters (Caplan 2001; Rubin 2003; Klamer 2007; Reay 2012), polit-
ical positions (Kearl et al. 1979; Klein and Stern 2006; Fuller and Geide-
Stevenson 2007) as well as questions of morality (Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi 
1993; Frey and Meier 2003). Multiple authors have attempted to defend econ-
omists’ perspectives, either by presenting studies in which economists display 
greater potential for cooperation than comparable groups (Yezer, Golfarb and 
Poppen 1996; Laband and Beil 1999; Frey and Meier 2003; Hu and Liu 2003; 
Zsolnai 2003), or by arguing for the greater moral value of self-interested indi-
viduals (Lanteri 2008). Nevertheless, the findings leave little doubt that econ-
omists are indeed more oriented towards self-interest and profitability, and are 
less morally oriented, than other population groups.1 
These findings give rise to the question as to how people actually become 
economists. To date, no satisfactory answer to this question has been given. 
Instead, one might assert that the education of economic scientists continues to 
be something of a “black box” in sociological research (Maesse 2017). There 
exist, at best, a few isolated findings on the structural role of graduate schools 
(Colander 2006, 2007; Fourcade 2009; Maesse 2014, 2017), on economic 
textbooks (Hill 2000; Kalmi 2006; Baer 2012; Zuidhof 2013), or on the curric-
ulum in the teaching of economics (Brue 1996; Parkin 2000; Gärtner 2001; 
Gärtner, Griesbach and Jung 2013). It is the goal of this article to bring to the 
discussion a viable theoretical model for a better understanding of the relation-
ship between the biographical career and the professional behaviour of eco-
nomic scientists. My central argument is that, in order to conceptualize and 
                                                             
1  The extent to which this orientation is to be considered positive or negative is discussed 
with much controversy and critique in the economic sciences (e.g. Davis 2006; Dequech 
2007-2008; Fullbrook 2007, 2009; Freeman 2010). The debate regarding the modernization 
of the economic sciences is, however, of no consequence for this article. 
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empirically analyse the economists’ profession, one must take into account 
both the substantive and epistemological character of their academic socializa-
tion as well as the process of socialization in the professional field of the eco-
nomic sciences. As biographical competencies – patterns of thought and per-
ception – influence not just everyday behaviour, but also the occupational 
behaviour of economists, it should be asked, with specific reference to Pierre 
Bourdieu’s habitus-field concept, how the entire habitus and the formation of 
an “economic style of reason” (Hirschman and Berman 2012, 790) can be 
examined as a conceptual whole. 
To this end, I propose a theoretical approach in which research interests are 
focused equally on the process of the socialization of economic scientists both 
academically and professionally, taking into account their underlying habitus. 
In other words: I am of the opinion that socialization first takes place in an 
academic context, when studying the economic sciences, but that economists 
first truly become economic scientists upon their entry into the field of the 
economic sciences as a profession. I will demonstrate that, in order to analyse 
the economic profession, one must take into consideration both the preliminary 
phase of academic socialization and the later phase of professional socialization 
into the field of economic sciences. 
As such, the following observations correspond directly to findings from re-
search on academic cultures specific to certain disciplines. This form of re-
search assumes that each academic discipline has its own cultural field, and 
that students will, during their studies, develop an academic habitus specific to 
that field (Bucher and Strass 1961; Becher and Trowler 2001). This perspective 
is, however, overly flexible, since the resulting antithesis between academic 
habitus and everyday principles of assessment is unworkable in practice. An 
academic habitus cannot simply be interpreted as behaviour in the form of 
certain roles, and therefore cannot be separated from an actor’s personality 
(Krais and Gebauer 2002). 
On a superordinate level, then, this article aims to uncover the main mecha-
nisms driving the habitus formation in economists, and to develop a compre-
hensive framework for researching these processes. In order to illustrate my 
argument, I make use of both empirical findings from research on the academic 
culture of scientists, and of my own material derived from interviews with 
professors in several different disciplines at German universities. The empirical 
findings attest to the existence of specific forms of socialization in economics, 
in both academic studies and the professional field. The implementation of 
Bourdieu’s habitus-field concept shows that a habitus of the economic profession 
cannot be derived merely from the process of socialization in a professional or 
academic context, for a perspective of this kind disregards the uniformity of a 
person’s actions, reproducing instead only the occupational or situative forms 
of behaviour in specific roles. As such, the approach applied here furthers 
traditional research on academic cultures, which assumes that familial (or bio-
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graphical) primary socialization and occupational (or academic) secondary 
socialization occur in isolation from one another, and represent different stages 
of the life course. 
The chief value of the habitus-field concept for the analysis of the field of 
economic science is in the way in which it takes into account the intermediate 
character of the relationship between subject and object, between structure and 
action, and between position and positioning, thus creating a framework for the 
analysis of the interaction between the formation of habitus and the structures 
of a field. According to Bourdieu (1996 [1979], 101), the practice to be ex-
plained is composed of the combination of opportunities for action (habitus and 
capital) within certain structures (field). With his concept of habitus, Bourdieu 
describes a person’s “schemes of perception, thought and action,” in which the 
incorporation of all their prior social experiences is expressed (Bourdieu 1990 
[1980], 54). For Bourdieu, the habitus is the underlying structure of behavioural 
patterns; it can create an infinite number of regulated practices to adapt to new 
situations, while simultaneously guaranteeing the consistency of an individu-
al’s action over multiple contexts and situations (for more details, see Bourdieu 
1990 [1980], 1996 [1979]; Jenkins 2001 [1992]; Lenger, Schneickert and 
Schumacher 2013b). The concept of habitus is complemented by Bourdieu’s 
concept of the field: This addition is founded on the insight that an individual 
will not, in fact, behave identically in every specific context, but that “depend-
ing upon the stimuli and structure of the field, the very same habitus will gen-
erate different, even opposite, outcomes” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 135). 
This article is structured as follows: First, I will sketch out key research 
findings on the academic culture of economics. Although there have, to date, 
been no comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and systematic investigations of 
young people’s career selection motives, the individual findings essentially 
point to a selection effect by which certain groups of people are significantly 
more likely than others to choose to study the economic sciences (Section 2). 
These observations will be further substantiated in the next section, using inter-
views with professors of economics, in which characteristics specific to the 
field come to light which reinforce the selection process during the education of 
economists (Section 3). The insight that the unique nature of economic scientists 
is a result predominantly of selection effects and subjective perceptions at the 
start of their studies, reinforced during schooling and socialization processes in 
the field by adaptive learning outcomes, corresponds directly to Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus, and his notion of field-specific habitus (Section 4). The 
article concludes with a brief summary (Section 5). 
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2. Academic Socialization in the Economic Sciences: 
Indoctrination and Self-Selection 
Questions regarding the emergence of a specific disciplinary pattern of behav-
iour and the existence of an academic habitus in the economic sciences can 
only be answered empirically. It must be established which empirical findings 
point to the development of a field-specific habitus during the study of the 
economic sciences, and consequently which conclusions are to be drawn for the 
education of future economists. In order to establish the existence of an aca-
demic habitus in the economic sciences, firstly, the following section will ex-
pand upon existing studies on selection and indoctrination effects. Subsequent-
ly, these observations will be complemented by additional qualitative surveys, 
as well as some reflections from occupational sociology. From the perspective 
of a sociology of economics, it should be noted that economic scientists have 
contributed a great deal of empirical findings on their own profession, albeit 
without systematizing these findings; also, they neither critically reflect upon 
the relevant consequences, nor do they apply them to a discussion of the status 
quo in economic sciences. 
It has already been noted that multiple experimental studies have shown that 
economists display more egoistical and self-interested behaviour than the gen-
eral population (illustrative here are the prominent studies by Marwell and 
Ames 1981; Frey 1986; Carter and Irons 1991; Frank, Gilovich and Regan 
1993, 1996; Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi 1993; Rubinstein 2006; a good over-
view is given in Ruske and Suttner 2012). These studies are evidence of practi-
cal behaviour analogue to the heuristic – as taught in mainstream economics 
study programmes – of a strictly rational, self-interest oriented, profit-
maximizing homo oeconomicus (Colander 2006). By now, it should be indis-
putable – the findings can certainly be interpreted in this way – that economists 
behave with a stronger orientation towards self-interest and profit than the 
average citizen. The adoption of the heuristic for real processes of decision and 
action is aptly referred to by Michel Callon (2007) as the performativity of 
economics. Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames (1981) were able to show, for 
example, that students of economics will offer significantly lower group con-
tributions in public good games than students of other subjects.2 John Carter 
and Michael Irons found the same effect in ultimatum games (Carter and Irons 
1991). 
                                                             
2  It is, however, in principle worth noting that – with 49% in the general population, and 
24% among students of economics – these individuals all deviate significantly from the 
dominant strategy of non-participation, which is what the economic behavioural model 
would theoretically predict. 
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There are three competing schools of thought in literature explaining these 
differences (Lenger 2016). The first fraction advances what it calls the theory 
of indoctrination or learning, where students’ economics degree programme 
‘indoctrinates’ them with certain values (e.g. Frank, Gilovich and Regan 1993; 
Selten and Ockenfels 1998). Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this 
theory was Georg Stigler, who argued as long ago as the 1950s that the main 
reason for the more conservative attitudes among economists was their aca-
demic education:  
The main reason for the conservatism surely lies in the effect of the scientific 
training the economist receives. He is drilled in the problems of all economic 
systems and in the methods by which a price system solves these problems. It 
becomes impossible for the trained economist to believe that a small group of 
selfish capitalists dictates the main outlines of the allocation of resources and 
the determination of outputs. (Stigler 1959, 528)  
Empirical support for Stigler’s theory can be found, for example, in Scott and 
Rothman (1975). They researched the effect of just a one-semester introductory 
economics course on student opinions relating to economic issues. Like Stigler, 
they found that economics students and students with higher TUCE (Test of 
Understanding of College Economics) scores tend to be more conservative. 
A second group, representing a contrary position to the indoctrination school 
of thought, concludes that, even before beginning their studies, economists 
already display very different preferences from those of other young students. 
Steven E. Rhoads pointedly summarizes this perspective as follows:  
People who think that the best things in life are free are not likely to become 
economists. People who think money matters and narrow self-interest makes 
sense are more likely to become economists. (Rhoads 1985, 162)  
The argument is that differences established between economists and non-
economists can be ascribed to (self) selection effects. According to this theory, 
certain groups of people are more likely to choose to study economic sciences 
than other groups do (Carter and Irons 1991; Frank, Gilovich and Regan 1993; 
Frey and Meier 2003, 2005; Lanteri 2008; Ruske and Suttner 2012). 
The selection theory is based on empirical findings such as the comparative 
study by Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993); here, different population groups 
were asked about their opinion on price mechanisms and other allocation pro-
cesses. Along with a control group, the sample contained students in introduc-
tory economics lectures and more advanced economics students. The results 
show significant differences between students in their first semester and the 
general population, but not between first semester students and more advanced 
students (ibid., 273-7). 
In order to test these results, Haucap and Just (2010) replicated the study: As 
in the original study, their evaluation patterns showed significant differences 
between the first-year economists and other groups. However, the difference is 
even greater for the more advanced economists. Their findings suggest that 
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individuals’ values with regard to price mechanisms differ even before entering 
university, but that they are also influenced (or indeed reinforced) by the study 
programme itself. It seems that there is a level of interaction between the selec-
tion and the learning effect (cf. Cipriani, Lubian and Zago 2009):  
Overall, it appears that students in economics classes tend to naturally like the 
market, but this preference is further nurtured over the course of their study. In 
addition, students in economics courses apparently become more sceptical re-
garding local community allocation. (Haucap and Just 2010, 245) 
These two approaches, both of which focus on the specific preferences of 
economists, are complemented by a third faction that does not ascribe specific 
behaviour of economists to their academic socialization or a process of self-
selection. Rather it explains these specific forms of behaviour during experi-
ments as the result of a greater ability to assess subjective restrictions. The 
argument here is that the differences found between the behaviour of econo-
mists and normal citizens cannot necessarily be attributed to internalized pref-
erences specific to economists’ divergent moral orientations: Rather, their 
actions are the result of their greater knowledge of the field. The theory being 
proposed here is that economists, when participating in economic experiments, 
achieve better (or more self-serving) game results because they assess both 
subjective and objective restrictions (that is, the game situations) differently, in 
a manner better suited to the situation: In other words, they have greater exper-
tise with regard to economic distribution experiments (cf. Lenger and Wolf 
2018). The underlying social preferences, however, are thought to be the same 
as those of other population groups. 
Proponents of the expertise theory state that the differences manifested be-
tween the various groups are merely revealed preferences (Samuelson 1948), 
and that the underlying intended behaviour is ultimately unobservable. Conse-
quently, no inference can be made as to individuals’ actual orders of preference 
or utility functions (Bruni and Sugden 2007). With reference to findings from 
empirical research on justice (Miller 1999), the argument from this perspective 
is that any differences found by experiments are ‘merely’ framing effects 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Ellingsen et al. 2012); on an individual level, it 
is argued, interpretive frameworks function as mental representations and 
interpretations of the world, which result – in market situations (Liberman, 
Samuels and Ross 2004), or in competitive environments like the banking 
sector (Cohn, Fehr and Götte 2014) – in self-serving behaviour and are inter-
preted, in these specific contexts, as the social norm (Bicchieri 2006). This 
perspective is compatible with the psychological explanatory model, which 
states that the self-serving behaviour we observe in experiments is merely a 
reflection of “local characteristics,” activated exclusively in connection with 
specific situations (Miller 2003, 368, 382-8). One common explanation for the 
learning effect is thus that students of economics, when participating in labora-
tory experiments, categorize their situative decision options differently, and 
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more in line with the “economic way of thinking” than students of other sub-
jects (Lanteri 2008, 17). 
The empirical data available on academic socialization must thus be consid-
ered highly ambivalent, and a conclusive assessment is not possible now. It 
should be noted that in empirical analyses of this phenomenon, the selection 
theory is inferred from the fact that the differences found between economists 
and non-economists can already be observed in first year students (Frey and 
Meier 2003, 452), and it is in this context that Alessandro Lanteri rightly points 
out two key problems with the studies currently available: On the one hand, 
there is still a lack of relevant studies on the indoctrination effect in schools 
(Lanteri 2008, 12), and on the other, economists as a group are compared with 
the highly heterogeneous group of non-economists, which might disguise the 
similar forms of behaviour in other academic fields (ibid., 15). Furthermore, it 
should be made clear that the empirical findings provide evidence for all three 
interpretations. Together, the studies indicate the presence of a selection effect, 
or a significantly stronger selection effect compared to the learning effect or the 
perceived restrictions effect (Ruske and Suttner 2012, 181; Lanteri 2008, 3). 
The key difference between the three explanatory approaches is, in my opinion, 
that while the indoctrination faction consider preferences to be variable and 
mutable, the selection and restriction factions present arguments for fundamen-
tal preferences in the sense of stable behavioural dispositions – that is, of a 
habitus operating in the background. In this case, the findings would be indica-
tive of the effect of a formative, underlying habitus, making this argument the 
point of departure for the theoretical observations in Section 4. Nevertheless, it 
seems important to point out again that a definite empirical documentation of 
individuals’ economic preferences is yet to be made, and that this undertaking 
cannot be accomplished with methods of experimental economics (Lenger and 
Goldschmidt 2014). However, before we further discuss the empirical findings 
on academic socialization, I would like to point to the specific conditions under 
which professional socialization in the field of economics takes place. 
3. Professional Socialization in the Field of Economic 
Sciences 
In order to become an economic scientist, students – having studied economics 
and undergone an academic socialization – must enter the field of economic 
sciences. It is at this point that research focuses on questions of professional 
field socialization. I argue that students are not part of the economic field since 
they do not compete for positions in the field and do not hold own positions in 
scientific form and content. However, studying economics and adopting an 
economic habitus must be seen as some kind of field socialisation enabling 
students in the first place to enter the field of economics as a professional. I 
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will approach these questions drawing on insights gathered by interviewing 32 
professors in various subjects at German universities.3 To get a better under-
standing of the following findings, it should be noted beforehand that the field 
of economics has undergone a transformation, beginning in the 1950s, so that it 
now resembles a quasi-scientific discipline. Today, Modern Economics – in the 
sense of a mathematized and supposed value-free approach to microeconomics, 
macroeconomics, and econometrics – is taught universally in practice (Blinder 
1999; Colander 2007; Lenger and Taaffe 2014). As such, it can be said that 
there exists little variance with regard to the economic content taught at differ-
ent venues of higher education. 
In order to analyse social fields, the interaction between the field and the ac-
tors participating in that field must be defined. Fields, here, consist of a com-
plex relationship of dependency between dispositions, positions, and position-
ings (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104-5). The explicit and implicit epistemic 
knowledge-base which professors acquire dispositively are dependent on their 
position in the field, and manifest in the corresponding substantive positionings 
(cf. Maesse 2018; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2018). Disposition is the term for the 
habitual preconditions with which a professor is equipped, and which he or she 
uses in the competition for social positions in the field. Of crucial importance 
here, are social background, academic education, and professional socializa-
tion; someone who has grown up in an upper middle-class setting has different 
attitudes to the academic world and scientific research than someone whose 
background is less characterized by intellectual pursuits. As with all social 
fields, a habitus attuned to the specific field of the economic sciences repre-
sents a competitive advantage for improved opportunities in this field. 
The logic and structure of social fields are nonetheless not identical with the 
structure of the social space. Rather, it should be noted that fields which are in 
some way involved with symbolic production implement their own specific 
logic and field-internal rules, thus creating a sort of refractory effect: This logic 
can be best visualized with reference to the process of positioning in the aca-
demic field (for example in Bourdieu’s work, positioning is an academic’s 
scientific output). The academic field is thus a productive space, one in which 
scientific contribution is ordered hierarchically. Scientific works are only 
                                                             
3  In the context of a research project on the working and living circumstances of professors 
at the University of Freiburg, a total of 32 guided, problem-oriented interviews were carried 
out at German universities with professors of various subjects (for more information see 
Lenger 2015, 2017; Lenger et al. 2016). For the purposes of this paper the three economists 
from the corpus as a whole were compared to the professors from other subjects. The inter-
views all lasted between one and two hours, and were structured according to six question 
complexes, although efforts were made to preserve a general sense of conversation, in the 
spirit of a process-oriented form of interviews. In order to reconstruct the process of pro-
fessional field socialization, both the agency analysis and the qualitative content analysis 
method were used. 
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noteworthy through their relevance to other scientific contributions and dis-
courses, by way of connections to existing scientific papers and so on. Decisive 
here is that scientific papers, especially an individual’s doctorate and habilita-
tion, are assigned a distinct value which functions as a unique distinguishing 
feature, and thus may be perceived as a specific positioning in the field. Citing 
established work is, in this context, both a strategy of dissociation from and of 
participation in the scientific discourse. 
The process of scientific positioning thus stands in direct correlation to a 
scientist’s disposition, at least to the extent that their habitus forms the founda-
tion of their aesthetic perception. Here, Bourdieu proposes a homology be-
tween dispositions and scientific positioning: The social opportunities for the 
production of scientific work and their actual substantive production are, for 
Bourdieu, the two elements that determine one’s position in the social field. 
When applied to the scientific field, scientific positioning is thus representative 
of the efforts that individuals expend in competing for reputation in their aca-
demic occupations. The implementation of certain themes, spheres of research, 
or methods is thus the result of a process of reflection or categorization with 
regard to the intrinsic value of specific approaches in the scientific field. 
A field analysis has to take all three tiers into account: the tier of habitual 
disposition, characterized by the social setting during primary and secondary 
socialization; the tier of positioning in the scientific field, characterized by rites 
of initiation and tertiary socialization in the field itself; and the tier of the cur-
rent position in the field, characterized by an individual’s academic career and 
their available reserves of field-specific capital. As such, a Bourdieusian field 
analysis runs counter to both a purely epistemological perspective on scientific 
production and to a purely social perspective on forms of scientific organiza-
tion (Lenger and Rhein 2018). According to Bourdieu, neither the scientists 
themselves nor their scientific research can be taken as the sole starting point in 
the analysis of an academic field; rather, it is the underlying structures – incor-
porated in the habitus of the participating actors, and expressed in terms of 
field-specific forms of capital, opinions, and disputes – which reveal the struc-
ture of the scientific field. 
In the following, I present the representational patterns of the interviewed 
economists. The first key finding is, as is the case for other disciplines, that a 
great deal of influence on an individual’s personality and career is ascribed to 
their study programme and place of education: “Your studies shape you, no 
question at all.” The venue of higher education is emphasized as being particu-
larly formative: “In that sense, [Place] had a very strong influence on me, and 
even today, I still say that I studied under [Person].” As in other disciplines, 
economists underline the formative effect of where they studied, although 
tellingly they do not impute a connection between the venue and the actual 
content or focus of their studies, emphasizing instead the personal relationship 
with a mentor. One professor, for example, stated:  
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Where I studied? Not all that important. […] I mean, it was a town I liked liv-
ing in, and a faculty where I had lots of friends and acquaintances, but it 
wasn’t as important to me as perhaps for other people, I think, where the actu-
al work took place. 
As in all other disciplines, the role of the supervisor in a PhD student’s sociali-
zation was felt by economists to be particularly important (“played a really 
major role”). Admittance into the scientific field (again, as in other disciplines) 
occurred as the result of being directly approached by the prospective doctoral 
supervisor: “And so my supervisor invited me to come and speak to him.” This 
phase is referred to explicitly as a rite of initiation  
it was this big name in research, [Name], who first got me involved. Firstly, it 
was the impression [he/she] made on me, but then also the way [he/she] in-
cluded me from the very start… That was kind of my initiation.  
In doing so, participants emphasized the fact that both their mentor’s personali-
ty and their own involvement in the institution were necessary to enable their 
first steps in the scientific field. “And [he/she] also gave me a proper grounding 
in econometrics and theory.” The authority of these traditional initiation circles 
flows from established professors, described by the novices as “personalities” 
with “a great deal of influence,” who prepare their protégés for a scientific 
career: “[Name] more or less was my initiation, and [he/she] said to me, at the 
last conference we visited together, ‘I can definitely see you continuing with 
this.’” As a whole, the economists analysed here, as professors in other disci-
plines, demonstrate the typical process of field socialization via initiation and 
acceptance on the part of established personalities (cf. Engler 2001; Beaufays 
2003; Schneickert 2013). It is important to note that the place of education and 
doctoral supervisor structure not only the dispositions, but also the economists’ 
positions, in the form of symbolic capital, throughout their career. However, the 
professors surveyed here are categorically not reaffirming the power of agency 
over their own careers; they describe a passive form of field socialization which 
can be widely observed in the academic field in general (cf. Lenger et al. 2016): 
and then I got a nice position with a good starting wage, secure for the 
whole time I was there […] and I was able to finish my habilitation quite 
comfortably, and it was all pretty great.  
On the other hand, significant differences compared to other disciplines in the 
social sciences can be observed with regard to, firstly, the above-average as-
sessment of the value of graduate schools; secondly, the strong emphasis on 
time spent abroad; and thirdly, the importance of the working group for the 
research process and for the scientific working method itself. 
Particularly noteworthy is the economists’ consistently positive assessment 
of structured PhD programmes, which impart the “methodological equipment” 
and academic “refinement” necessary for “successful research in the future,” 
for example “how to write a good article.” One becomes, to a certain extent, 
“empowered” to work in the sciences; “you take a lot with you,” the “focus 
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becomes stronger than ever,” “really going into depth.” The programmes’ 
function in providing a service is always emphasized here:  
If you have decided as a postgrad to focus, say, on a quantitative approach, 
whatever the orientation, it’s always helpful to have been somewhere like that 
and not to have to have taught it all to yourself. 
On this level of socialization, the process of personal development towards 
becoming a researcher is also foregrounded: “There was a strong research 
orientation, which was introduced there by way of a deeper focus on methodo-
logy.” The sense of still being educated is particularly underlined: “Well, you 
really have to think about whether you really want to go through that again, 
continue with your education.” The doctorate is conceptualized as the third step 
in one’s education, after school and the first university degree, which – unlike 
in other disciplines – does not end with a master’s degree itself. Participation in 
a graduate programme is also equated with positive future career outcomes:  
Basically, when you do the graduate programme, you put off earning money 
for two years, or maybe three years, and you have to make sure you’re making 
ends meet. Gets pretty stressful, over time, and you have to work hard, but 
then again, at the end of the process it has a pretty good return. 
Alternatively, a graduate programme might be seen as a way of reducing the 
chances of failure, saving a lot of “time” and “risk”: “It can free you from a lot 
of things – and it wasn’t an option before, which is why a lot of people did fail, 
because they just weren’t able to acquire the formal apparatus on their own.” 
The structure of the graduate programme is considered to be a positive de-
velopment for the discipline:  
On the doctoral level, we have a lot more graduate programmes than before, 
which means, firstly, that people are getting a better education; secondly, they 
also have more freedom now, with more grants allowing people to write their 
dissertations without having to teach as part of the faculty. 
“That means the opportunities for taking part in a graduate programme are better 
than they once were. It really offers a lot of opportunities.” Correspondingly, 
this kind of structured programme is widely seen as a positive: “Well, to pretty 
much complete an entire doctoral programme on that level, to really tackle 
these things in depth, methodologically […] I would say that’s quite tempting.” 
The high relevance of these structured PhD programmes corresponds directly 
to the great value ascribed to time spent abroad during one’s education. The 
“decision to travel abroad lead, ultimately, to a really profound, fundamental 
development.” As in other disciplines, time overseas was described as “very 
productive,” bringing with it “lots of input” and a way to “break out of the 
relatively uninteresting world at your own university.” Additionally, even 
during the doctorate itself, time abroad also takes on the function, in the eco-
nomic sciences, of network building and international cooperation:  
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And then I went overseas: First I was in [Country A], and then [Country B], 
and I finished my dissertation at that time, already beginning my work with 
my colleagues there too.  
It is significant that contacts such as these do not come about by chance, but are 
planned strategically: “That is, I really did plan it like that, essentially.” Time 
spent abroad, in particular, is seen as a key requirement for progress in the 
scientific field, and the strategic side of this is noted: “Then, I also went to 
[Country C], with the basic plan to continue there, and I mentioned this straight 
away to [Name] when he made me the offer.” These contacts are maintained 
and implemented in the transition into the post-doc phase: “On the post-
doctoral level, in particular, in [Country D] then, there was a good group of 
people, who I could really work with. And this led to further projects.” This 
cooperation is itself dominated by strategic career planning:  
We had […] better chances of being accepted by the top journals if we were 
working with Americans, or with researchers from American universities, 
compared to European ones. And you have to use that. These are the network 
effects that are important, and it’s no good being naïve, you know […] they’re 
not just waiting for you. 
However, this context does not merely assume international cooperation; time 
spent abroad “is also a kind of signal on your résumé.” In cases where no time 
has been spent abroad, the assessment is clear: “Basically, if you haven’t, until 
then, up to your doctorate, left Germany, you have to leave right after doing 
your thesis, you have to spend the first year of the post-doc period overseas.” 
This position is reinforced by a professor who “emphatically recommend[s]” a 
stay overseas, calling it “a big mistake not to.” 
Explicit reference is made here to the positive effects of a guest residence in 
the USA, or participation in conferences there (“you can go to America, too”). 
The perception is that “international interdependence has increased,” and that 
“increasingly, the scientific community internationally is converging.” As such, 
“it seems to make sense to go abroad.” Time spent in the USA is seen as an 
explicit competitive advantage in Germany. Symptomatic here is the systematic 
relationship between structured doctoral programmes and time spent overseas: 
“Well, if you want to go through the doctoral programme, and you get a chance 
to do your PhD at a top college in the States, why not? It’s a great opportunity, 
you have to take it.” The findings sketched out here corroborate directly those 
on the United States’ global dominance in the economic sciences (Blinder 
1999; Lebaron 2006; Reay 2012; Fourcade, Ollion and Yann 2015).  
A specific segment of the economics profession, generally US or UK educated, 
thus establishes its international power on the very basis of the contestability 
of national economics markets. (Fourcade 2006, 152)  
Recently, preliminary studies give evidence for the positive effect between 
time spent in the US and being offered a professorship in Germany and France 
(Beyer and Massih-Tehrani 2017). 
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There is a third factor, in which economics differ from other social sciences 
and humanities considerably: in their emphasis on scientific networks and 
collaboration in research groups.  
The appointments committee are looking for people who will be a real asset 
for their faculty, who are independent, who have personality, but who are still 
collaborative – not a narcissist, but someone who can work with colleagues 
but think independently.  
Networks are “very important” or even “extremely important”; this is some-
thing all the economists surveyed agreed upon, so that “you’re not alone in 
your scientific niche.” It is notable that, in their emphasis on networks and 
working groups, the economic sciences resemble a natural science, even explic-
itly discussing this structural affinity:  
Cooperation has become immensely important. Of course, this has been com-
mon practice in the natural sciences for years now. Almost always just having 
groups of researchers working together. But it’s become much more common 
in the economic sciences too.  
This structural change in the field of economics underscores the significance of 
the qualitative shift the discipline has undergone. Where intellectual personalities 
used to dominate the field – as in the other humanities and arts – (and they are 
still thought of as responsible for initiation into the field), the surveyed profes-
sors’ perception of the modes of operation in the economic sciences is one of a 
transition to a more strictly scientific working practice (cf. Knorr Cetina 1981, 
1999). In this description of the field’s logic, groups of authors and researchers 
take the place originally occupied by individuals: “I am absolutely convinced 
[…] that the average number of authors in the Top Five has gone up in the last 
thirty years.” Interestingly, the professor quoted here explains this increase 
with the emergence of experimental economics (cf. Jatteau 2018), a decidedly 
scientific, laboratory-based research approach:  
Well, the mere fact that, in experimental economic research, you often have, 
or need, teams of author, because carrying out experiments takes a fair amount 
of time, and you need an appropriate division of labour. That all points to the 
proliferation of networking and working in teams of authors. 
The construct of the research group is defined, in turn, by a form of socializa-
tion specific to the field, albeit now in a different context. Initiation into the 
field still occurs by way of personalities:  
When I was writing my first papers with [Name], we sat together at a round 
table. [He/she] chain-smoked, and we drank pots and pots of coffee, going 
over wordings together. Like, we really wrote the text together. Very few people 
do that. Of course, that’s more or less a kind of club good that [he/she] was 
providing for [his/her] colleagues there. [He/she] basically taught us like that. 
This collaborative intercession has its roots equally in the field-specific sociali-
zation discussed above and in the dominant status of individual personalities, 
though now with a focus on establishing a network-based polis and social capital 
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(Boltanski and Chiapello 2006 [1999]; Lenger 2015). Working groups are 
constructed here, as in the physical sciences, in a quasi-familial context (Beau-
fays 2003), understood as “scientific friendship networks.” In this respect, it 
should be noted that economics constitute a social science when considering 
their object, but that the methods of operation, compared to other social sciences, 
clearly display characteristics of research practices from the natural sciences. 
4. Academic Habitus and Field-Specific Socialization in 
Economics 
In this closing section, I will show how the empirical findings on academic and 
professional socialization in the field of economics sketched out before can be 
theoretically localized. Here Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus-field theory systemati-
cally links individual dispositions (preferences) and field structures (positions 
and positionings). It allows us to focus on economic scientists’ consistent and 
coherent everyday behaviour, even if they are following no formal rules and do 
not have access to complete information regarding the field of economics itself. 
I have already pointed out that the theoretical concept of a professional habi-
tus, as often assumed in research on academic cultures, is way too static: The 
resulting opposition between an academic habitus and everyday principles of 
evaluation is not, in practice, valid; an academic habitus cannot be interpreted 
as role-based behaviour, being instead inseparably intertwined with the habitus 
as a whole (Krais and Gebauer 2002). Whereas the supposed analytical poten-
tial of the term “role” comes from the way it enables an explanation of varying 
social behaviour in specific situations, it must be noted that – from the perspec-
tive of habitus-field theory – such divisions into multiple social roles is not 
representative of reality, and there is no analytical validity to the idea of a mere 
“performer of roles who, as if using a coat rack, can switch between various 
roles” (Krais 2004, 94; own translation). The underlying evaluative patterns of 
the habitus, learned during primary socialization, cannot simply be ignored – 
on the contrary, they form the basis of every professional habitus. 
The question remains as to the mutability of habitual personality characteris-
tics over an individual’s life course. If one adheres to Bourdieu with regard to 
the adaptability of the habitus, there exists little margin for freely chosen be-
haviour or radical breaks with one’s previous biography (Bourdieu 1996 
[1979], 109, 142; 1990 [1980], 63). A habitus, once it is incorporated, possess-
es a considerable degree of persistence, and its effects can be felt throughout 
the life course in spite of changing social circumstances; while doing so, how-
ever, it remains in the background as an influence on the personality, and can 
be conceived of in the field as essentially open:  
Habitus is not the fate that some people read into it. Being the product of his-
tory, it is an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experi-
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ences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces 
or modifies its structures. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 133) 
Based on Bourdieu’s construct, it seems highly implausible that a person’s 
habitus might be completely subsumed under a professional or academic habitus. 
At this point, the benefits of the habitus-field concept for the analysis of the 
economic habitus and for a sociology of economics become clear: In practice, 
social actors act in accordance with their fundamental habitus, and do not simp-
ly adjust their behaviour to conform to professional demands and discipline-
specific role expectations. The habitus forms a stable and practically immutable 
basic structure, from which patterns of behaviour may diverge occasionally, but 
not permanently. The conformity conflicts arising from the disparity between 
habitus and field structure are mirrored, illustratively, in the dissatisfaction felt 
by many students of economics with their degree programmes, and may also 
partially explain the protests voiced against the one-sided dominance of main-
stream economics (Komlos 2015; Lenger 2016; cf. also the discussions on this 
topic in the Journal of Real-World Economics Review). Attempted explanations 
fall short in the sense that they ascribe self-interested behaviour to individually 
framed game situations and stereotypical role behaviour:  
It seems plausible that freshmen play the way they believe an economist 
should behave. Such a belief, moreover, probably follows some stereotypical 
idea of economists. (Lanteri 2008, 18) 
The relationship between primary and secondary socialization is, however, yet 
to be fully established within Bourdieu’s habitus-field concept (Lenger, 
Schneickert and Schumacher 2013a, 23, 30). It is Bourdieu’s fundamental 
insight that habitual dispositions remain stable over time, and continue to de-
fine praxis even when they are no longer suitable for the structures of a chang-
ing environment (Bohn and Hahn 2007, 260). The assumption of hysteresis, or 
inertia (cf. Bourdieu 1996 [1979], 109; 1990 [1980], 59) implies the presence 
of a certain “prevalence of primary conditioning in the socialization process, 
which leads to a theory of the endurance of the conditions of acquisition in the 
forms of practice” (Bohn and Hahn 2007, 260; own translation). 
It is indisputable that there is a need for a conceptual distinction between 
primary socialization at a developmental age and secondary socialization as an 
adult (Cicourel 1993). Jefferey Everett, for example, locates the habitus be-
tween private, primary socialization and occupational, secondary socialization: 
“Habitus is a combination of the social actor’s deeply ingrained identity and his 
or her less fixed, occupational identity” (Everett 2002). Cornelia Bohn and 
Alois Hahn (2007, 260-1) also propose a distinction between the “primary 
habitus,” originating in the family, and a multitude of “secondary habitus,” 
acquired and practised in the relevant social fields at later stages in a person’s 
biography. In doing so, they consolidate Bourdieu’s somewhat generalized 
observation that individuals, in addition to their original habitus, are required to 
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acquire additional capital relevant to each respective field, and thus create 
opportunities for action. 
Consequently, the habitus cannot be conceived as open, or at least easily 
changeable, as it cannot be equated with one specific action or a set of ways of 
acting; instead, in the background, primary socialization is acting as a signifi-
cant influence on one’s personality. Following on from the empirical findings 
on the selection and learning effect in the economic field, it is my opinion that 
the emergence of a professional economic habitus must be seen as an accumu-
lation of field-specific capital during the process of field socialization. All these 
processes of development, learning, construction, and crisis response are to be 
thought of as a life-long process, which economists undergo, because the con-
tinuous adaptation to their professional environment, a continual modification 
of their habitus. As such, economists carry with them upon entry into the field 
of economic sciences certain habitual dispositions deriving from individual 
class-specific, ethnic, cultural, and similar influences; they are also influenced 
by an additional, specifically academic effect by way of their educational and 
occupational career (Jenkins 2001 [1992], 90). 
As both of these aspects are taken into consideration, Bourdieu’s theory is 
suitable to provide a comprehensive framework to explain the formation of 
economists’ habitus. Despite the hysteresis effect and the lasting influence of 
the primary habitus (the selection and restriction effect), it is reasonable to 
argue that the habitus in the field of the economic sciences is essentially subject 
to adaptation and continual development (or learning effects). Bourdieu sums 
this up aptly when discussing the phenomenon of admittance into a field: 
In reality, what the new entrant must bring into the game is not the habitus 
that is tacitly or explicitly demanded there, but a habitus that is practically 
compatible, or sufficient close, and above all malleable and capable of being 
converted into the required habitus, in short, congruent and docile, amenable 
to restructuring. (Bourdieu 2000 [1997], 100) 
This leads to the development of a theoretical perspective which makes provi-
sions for the fact each individual discipline in tertiary education is characterized 
by specific academic cultures (Becher and Trowler 2001) and epistemological 
regimes (Knorr Cetina 1999); the question arises to what extent academic cul-
tures contribute to the constitution of modes of behaviour specific to certain 
disciplines by way of their specific mechanisms of admittance and exclusion, 
as well as via their (often concealed) dynamics of transmission and reproduc-
tion. From this perspective, a field-specific habitus is a set of dispositions and 
field-specific forms of capital, which an actor acquires over a period in familiar 
surroundings. Practical behaviour nevertheless continues to be decisively influ-
enced by the original habitus. This reading corresponds directly with the find-
ings sketched out here, on academic and on professional socialization in the 
field of economics, and provides a consistent theoretical explanation for the 
observability in practice of a selection effect and subsequent learning effect. 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  56 
5.  Conclusion 
The empirical findings in this article can only serve to indicate the potential for 
further research, although they point to far-reaching consequences for the fu-
ture of occupational sociological research on the sociology of economics. First-
ly, the findings demonstrate the durability of habitus dispositions throughout 
the process of academic and professional socialization. The findings sketched 
out here show clearly the specific modes of thought and behaviour displayed by 
economists, and corroborate the existence of a strong self-selection effect when 
students choose a degree programme, and of a mild learning effect of studying 
itself. The processes of field-specific education and capital accumulation on the 
doctoral and post-doc tiers strengthen this effect again. Individuals who are 
more oriented towards self-interest are significantly more likely to study eco-
nomics than other population groups. Furthermore, the results show the pres-
ence, during the education of economists in the academic field, of features 
unique to this field. Especially noteworthy here, compared to other social sci-
ences, are the positive estimation of structured PhD programmes, time abroad, 
and group work as part of the research process. 
Secondly, the findings raise the issue of the consequences of the appropria-
tion of working methods from the natural sciences in the field of economics 
and support the hypotheses that economics has not only turned into a quasi-
natural science on a solely epistemological level, but that the substantive trans-
formation resulting from the move towards experimental methods in economics 
has also been accompanied by a transformation of field-specific modes of work 
and career strategies. This, in turn, has manifested itself in a significant in-
crease in the emphasis on the relevance of working groups in the research 
process, of time spent in the US, and of third party funding, journal articles, 
and the like throughout one’s career. Of course, there will certainly be further 
consequences of these transformations in the academic field. Consequently, 
further research must ask which unintended effects will result, globally, from 
the orientation towards American economics, what effects academic accelera-
tion (new public management, rankings, ratings) will have on the production of 
knowledge in the economic sciences, and how the self-selection of future gen-
erations into economics will influence the discipline in its substance. 
Thirdly, the findings prove the analytical benefits of the habitus-field con-
cept for a sociology of economics and for the analysis of economic thinking in 
general. If the preceding discussion of the concept of habitus is taken as a basis, 
it quickly becomes clear that all three ‘economic’ attempts to explain education 
in economics ignore central aspects and consequences of both academic and 
professional socialization. Socialization in the field of economic sciences is 
neither solely a structural selection effect, nor wholly an act of free will with a 
subsequent learning effect. Rather, the observations made here corroborate the 
necessity, from the perspective of a sociology of economics, to create an inte-
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grative concept of both academic and professional socialization, and to analyse 
the working properties of economics as a science using the concept of field. 
Only if epistemological academic content and the structures specific to the field 
are examined in their interdependent interaction will we be sufficiently able to 
empirically grasp the characteristics of economics and understand these by 
comparing them to other disciplines and professions. This is a task which  
– considering both economic knowledge high levels of performativity and its 
creative, constructive power – would seem to be an urgent necessity. 
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